It is not at all uncommon to claim that everybody in Lebanon has blood on their hands, and thus there is no point in commenting on the bloody history of certain personas. However, it must be emphasized that such a statement is fallacious. Do you have blood on your hands?
Moreover, do ALL politicians have blood on their hands? The answer is no. And yet we have succeeded in limiting the political arena to a minimal set of those who not only had the bloodiest history, but more importantly have a failed PRESENT in governance (and please, don't blame that on Syria). Now it happens that these personas also have large gatherings (which is not a random coincidence), but does that imply those who don't identify with such groupings apathetically accept these warlords?
However, let's assume that it is true: everybody of importance has blood on their hands. Does it necessarily mean that they should not be held accountable? Maybe, but according to such logic, there is no need to counter other failings of the Lebanese state, such as the extreme levels of corruption, simply because ALL of those involved in the past 15 years were corrupt and embezzled millions (the current 40 billion dollar debt wasn't accumulated through constructive projects). These claims, and this attempt to not "punish," set a precedent for the future, and will lead to a failed state; it isn't only the existence of Hezbollah's arms that will be responsible for this. Accountability, a drive against corruption, and the development of a judicial system are fundamental building blocks of a sustainable state (the term "strong state" is just too amorphous to use constructively), and not vice versa. It would bode well if Lebanese citizens did not just accept the current status quo simply because "everyone was involved." Something has to break this cycle; acceptance will just eternalize it.
Since my laptop has failed, I went to the nearest store - i.e Fry's - for some services. Already frustrated that I would have to install all my programs again on a new computer, and adjust all the settings, etc. - things that would take more than a day - I was really not in the mood for small talk. Of course, the Gods had other plans ...
Sandra (Cashier, with a cardboard smile): Hi. Did you find everything you needed at Fryyyyyyy's?
Me: Yes. (here we go again.)
S: Did you take a look at the new electronics section at the far left?
M: I'll do that next time.
S: Ok that sounds greeeaaaaat. Although I would probably do that now, since it has a lot of useful gadgets.
M: Here's the service bill I need to pay.
S: Oh thanks, I'll just run that into the machine. Would you like to pay with your Fry's card or a normal credit card?
M: I'll just use the normal one.
S: Well, would you like to apply for the Fry's card.
M: No thanks, that's fine.
S: Are you aware of the benefits you get with the Fry's card?
M: Yes I am. Maybe later. (Ok, I lied. I'm not aware of the benefits. Nor do I care.)
S: So this is a service bill. While I'm scanning this, just let me inform you about the great discounts we have on DVD's today.
M: (Shoo habibti? Yalla.) I don't buy DVDs. Thanks anyway.
S: Well then, you must watch TV, right? You can't miss on the special offers in that area! ( Ok, she looked genuinely excited. That worried me.)
M: Listen, Sandra, I'm sort of in a rush. How much do I owe?
S: That'll be XY $.
M: Great. (Pass on my card.)
S: Thanks. I hope you found everything you needed at Fry's.
M: (Wait. Didn't you just ask that?) I'm sorry, did you say something? I didn't quite catch that.
S: I said "I hope you found everything you needed at Fry's."
M: I'm sorry, I can't hear what you saying.
S: I HOPE YOU FOUND EVERYTHING YOU NEEDED AT FRY'S. (still with that cardboard smile.)
M: Oh. No. Has my card been accepted?
S: Yeah, just sign here. Would you please fill in this form and tell us what you didn't find?
M: (No.) Sure, I'll do that later and drop it off again.
S: Oh, we wouldn't want to bother you. You can fill it out now.
M: There, it's signed. Thanks. Take care. (Run.)
Note to self: Next time, pretend I don't speak English.
Geagea is a sectarian war criminal. Everything he has said in the past year has revolved around his sectarian mindset. Nothing he has said in the past year has white-washed his war criminal background. Sunday was no exception. But then again, there was nothing surprising about that ...
So Nasrallah's Party held a rally today - I'll leave commentary and analysis on that to both his lovers and haters. However, I would like to discuss his insistence on the "When we build a strong and just state that is capable of protecting the nation and the citizens, we will easily find an honorable solution to the resistance issue and its weapons" notion. I will agree that not only is the current state weak in several aspects, but that it potentially does not even exist. But what I do not agree with is the use of abstract concepts such as a "strong and just state." What characteristics constitute a "strong state"? Only defense plans? Anti-israelism? Financial prosperity? Rights for all its civilians? Democracy? What? What checkpoints can be used to quantify how strong the government is becoming?
Without such classifications, Nasrallah's rhetoric is on par with a few of our other "leaders." Aoun calls for a "national unity government" without discussing the details of what that would bring to the Lebanese project, or the pros and cons of such a step. Jumblatt and co. call for equally such meaningless and abstract terms. "Unity" sounds lovely, as does "strong state", and "independence," and "democracy," but if those calling for such concepts don't elaborate on the required criteria, they sound like wannabe-leftists who sing kumbaya all day and hold hands under the sunset while calling for "Peace" - i.e. they offer no practical analysis of such abstract notions. And because of the lack of such practicality and depth, these characters, who excel in the use of meaningless rhetoric, have been active participants in keeping the Lebanese idea on the level of an idea. In fact, we all have been active participants because we have repeatedly allowed such rhetoric to drug us into submission.
My last post purposely ignored the role of elitist/traditional families in the perpetuation of the confessional system. Families such as the Jumblatts, the Gemayels, the Karamis, the Khazens, etc. have at one point or another, and to varying degrees, consolidated their political power within Lebanon by partly playing to confessional groupings. In addition to the prestige derived from political power, such families used (and some still use) their position to garner financial benefits. There is no reason for such families to attempt to change the current and corrupt system in place (this is a generalization; there have been some interesting exceptions in a couple of the mentioned families); why remove a "norm" that has helped line your pockets with gold, silver, and plain old cash? Pierre and Nadim are taking over for the Gemayels, Khazens have been in place since "forever" and have their mansion open to the "family" (for reasons other than niceties), Walid Jumblatt at times requires a percentage of the profits from some businesses in "his" area, and the existing titles of Sheikh, Beik, Emir, etc. play to the social prestige such families still enjoy. These families aren't in charge because they are right for the job, but are accepted by their respective "supporters" for various reasons, such as financial ones, in which the head of the family would hand out jobs and provide necessary contacts. Another reason (but not the only other one) can also be viewed as "the existential threat" which is verbalized by "X defends us." It is a classic argument of us vs. them; a point that can be made is that these groupings are not necessarily concrete, but rather of a constructive nature. These "faultlines" do fade (the extent of this "fade" depends on other factors) in the face of different groupings, as sociological experiments and studies, and, more importantly, "reality", have shown time and time again. It is easier though to assume the eternal and innate nature of confessional lines; this assumption lessens, and possibly ignores, the role these elite families have in propagating the myth of an existential threat, which is one tool they use to control their power base. The current political confessional system reinforces this myth, as is seen in arguments stating that this system defends the rights of minorities - at the expense of the individual, of course. Because of the necessary sectarian composition of the political body, most decisions taken by governing bodies will inevitably be perceived by portions of the public as having a sectarian flavor - and as a "threat" to their sect - thus empowering the elitist families, which have usually reacted to such situations under the pretence of "defending their sects," resulting in a vicious cycle. Unfortunately, these families will not abolish the confessional system, as they are here to "defend their constituents," and their feeble attempts at modifying the percentages can be viewed as attempts to hang on to the perks they had gathered. At the end of the day, only modifying the balance, as opposed to completely eradicating political confessionalism, will ensure that Lebanon is a nation of sects, thus catering to the families, as opposed to a nation of citizens.
Just a (possibly incorrect and definitely incomplete) "thought".
before i begin to discuss a topic that's been on my mind for a while, and which is still underdeveloped (so bear with some of the inconsistencies. i've found it oddly difficult to put these thoughts in written words, considering how smoothly it has come verbally ...), i just want to mention that i finally watched bosta yesterday, a movie i kept putting off till now. although it isn't my "cup of tea" (now where did that phrase come from?), i MUST state that aalia, a character in the movie, is fundamentally and faultlessly beautiful. her beauty is one that never dies. and no, that isn't a line i use.
oh well. that's that ... on that.
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in this post, i would like to deal with a specific subtopic: the assumptions of sectarianism, since a larger discussion of sectarianism (its unstable feedback, the misplaced belief that sectarianism leads to security, ...) requires much more time and thought. although i have the will to eventually discuss these topics here on this blog, i do acknowledge that my ideas concerning the topic need to mature.
i will start by stating the obvious: reality is complex. hence, simplified models of this reality are required in understanding such a reality. models are abundant in various fields - from the social sciences to mathematical sciences - but what is usually ignored in popular discussions of such models is that they developed from a set of clearly stated assumptions - a.k.a axioms. it is imperative to keep these in mind, lest the model be mistaken for reality.
for example, one such model that all individuals have taken for granted is arithmetics. we all know that 2 follows 1 and 3 follows 2 ad infinitum, but even this simple and life-changing system is based on a set of 5 axioms. euclidean geometry as taught in high-school is also based on 5 axioms and changing at least one of these axioms has led to non-euclidean geometry; one side-effect of this is that it is no longer necessary for the sum of angles in a triangle to equal 180 degrees ... something many take for granted.
in summary: with the same reality, different assumptions lead to different models.
enter lebanon. popular analysis of lebanese sociology - as opposed to more rigorous treatment (which does exist) - assumes that sectarian behavior is hard-coded in our genetic and social makeup. this is the lebanese social axiom # 1: individuals within sects speak with one voice.
the resulting model, which aims at explaining lebanese dynamics in terms of concrete sectarian blocks, does not mesh well with reality. even sectarian based representatives do not agree within individual sects, let alone the individuals who actually count - the lebanese citizens. it is obtuse to state that maronite # 1 has the same visions and beliefs and wants and needs as maronite # 2, simply because they are maronites (this thought process is a symptom of the confusion between correlation and causality). unfortunately, this model leads to a colored perception of reality, and its adherents constantly look for "evidence" within the lebanese scene in order to corroborate this model. when various politicians - claiming to represent their sect - argue, these sectomaniacs (pundits who insist on sectarian classifications) claim that this antagonism is currently inherent to the individuals within the sects. this leads to petty levels of analysis in terms of concepts such as the "christian political arena" and "the muslim political vision" (you know, i have to be fair to both religions by mentioning them both!). such incoherent analysis is not new; it is also prevalent within scientific circles that pride themselves on the use of the scientific method (one of the more famous examples of this comes from the pre-relativity days when renowned scientists erroneously insisted on the existence of "aether" in their attempt to explain the behavior of light.). in short, sectomaniacs spend their time molding reality to fit their model, as opposed to molding their model to fit reality.
classical examples of this model are "maronites want _____" and "sunnis want _____" (fill in the blanks), which are comments not based on any rigorous analysis, but rather, as my grandmother loves saying, on "haki niswen." of course, sectomaniacs state that since politicians discuss their points in terms of sects, their model is validated; this ignores the notion that local politicians are attempting to consolidate their power base by perpetuating the semblance of an existential threat (oddly enough, sectarian-based representation does anything but provide security.)
maybe, just maybe, it is time for certain groups of people to deal with the lebanese social scene with a new set of axioms. lebanese social axiom # 1 does not result in a reality-related model, and is based on misplaced simplicity; it can in fact also be argued that the propagation and insistence of such a model is directly related to the currently exponential rise in tensions (due to "positive" feedback), which creates an even more immediate need in re-evaluating the model and the underlying assumptions. we'll never know until we try, and unfortunately, time is running out.
a silly, stupid, and pointless speech by a silly, stupid, and pointless person is leading to a fascinating set of equally silly and stupid (and pointless depending on how you look at them) reactions. i will leave it to others to discuss the depth and width and height of all that is happening and will happen, but i would like to quote a quite relevant line from shakespeare.
"the fault, dear brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves."
lebanese political pretty boy (according to some friends. don't ask.) saad hariri inherited lebanon - or at least had planned to - when his father was brutally assassinated in a crime that shook lebanon. if some truly do think of saad as "cute and handsome" it is indeed a shame that his "looks" have not translated into political acumen and intelligence, for the prince that currently occupies the throne without even attempting to pick up the broken pieces of his kingdom has failed in ALL.
What exactly do we know about Saad? He is a businessman. He graduated from Georgetown. He made it to the Forbes List partly due to his inheritance - an inheritance mind you that is supposed to be taxed under Lebanese Law (but so much for the rule of the law). not much is publicly known - with regards to concrete information as opposed to hearsay - but the simple fact that he is his father's son makes all that insignificant.
and therein lies the dilemma. eventually, saad - who lacked so much in political skill that he had to be tutored in "beiruti" in order to appeal to the expected group of supporters (he is after all, just another populist) - will become prime minister because he is sunni, because the future movement is one of the many feudal tribes within lebanon, and because the other political parties will eventually support him for that position even if they are against him now. concessions will be made in return for certain compromises, not unlike what happened with nabih berri and the speaker of parliament chair.
at the end of the day, a lot of (justified) commotion can be made concerning hezbollah's arms and michel aoun's antics ... but because of this inherent feudal system, even if hezbollah is disarmed, something new will simply be created, since the fundamental rule of law in the lebanese political system is not the law itself, but feudalism, which institutionalizes certain existential-related paradigms. saad is just one example of this; it is indeed unfortunate that he is not the exception.
obviously i don't "support" saad, but i do want to wish his supporters good luck. so good luck ... because regardless of the cacophony they make when insisting that their way is the right way, they are in fact a big part of the current problems. not much will change within the bigger picture until they realize that. and as a final comment, if anything in this post sounds illogical, just blame it on black label. good night.
March 14, in its simplest distilled form, is a coalition of already existent political "parties" formed due to certain events in the past two years, and empowered by various strategic relationships. However, with the various initiatives March 14 has used to attempt to change the political face of Lebanon, it has remained a nascent political venture, set to fail unless it radically changes its political short-term and long-term strategy. This is all under the assumption that March 14 has Lebanon's best interest at heart, an assumption that will not be questioned in this post.
Over the past year, actions taken by March 14 indicate an internal belief that because it consists of major political players and names, which have already proven themselves, it should not view itself as an organization selling something "new" to the public. On the contrary, the "product" March 14 currently sells to the Lebanese public is marketed with pre-March 14 techniques. Therein lies the flaw, and although this may have worked in the first month of its existence, March 14 requires a marketing overhaul.
The faulty premise lies in the notion that repeating the same ideas, which may have worked with its current supporters, will attract people from other political bases - let's call them customers if you will. Unfortunately for March 14, it hasn't modified its marketing strategy to target these different segments of the market - the early majority (their supporters), and the late majority (everyone else). Entering the "late majority" market requires crossing a mental chasm which entails a revamping of strategy, as well as making use of several fundamental inflection points, such as competitive advantage and organizational leadership, two traits (among others) that March 14 has not handled too well.
It order to lock in a larger proportion of the Lebanese population, March 14 could have followed already tried strategies that have been applied over the past several decades with regards to novel private enterprises. March 14 is stuck in a similar situation that many of these "startups" find themselves in - they haven't defined nor created a "whole product" and they didn't initialize their "market" invasion with a product aimed at a niche market. On the contrary, March 14 mainly insisted on two things - the presidency and Hezbollah's arms. Although respectable goals, these are not "niche", and are certainly not achievable within the necessary time-frame. A decent marketing committee would have created a more realistic strategy, taking into consideration which market segment was being targeted, and modifying their strategy accordingly; this would have consisted of various stepping stones that deal with at least one of the myriad political and social issues currently plaguing Lebanon, thus giving March 14 much needed credibility. Dealing with a more thorough strategy would have allowed March 14 to morph from a "product"-based coalition - in which they sell "democracy" and a "state" - to a "market"-driven coalition - in which the "product" gets targeted directly to the relevant segment, as opposed to dealing with it in the currently abstract terms. By doing so, March 14 could have defined the battleground it is currently fighting on, giving it a much higher probability of winning. However, assuming that March 14 did all this, it still requires a long-term "plan" in order to ensure a realistic viability, as opposed to it just dragging around.
Unfortunately, March 14 did nothing of the sort. They can still revamp their approach, but that needs some fresh input. March 14 should either pray to all the gods for luck, or for a new marketing campaign. Me being who I am, I'd go for the latter. But who knows what they'll go for.
- disarm those who are armed. - work on the issue of the displaced. - create a republic based on equality of rights among all citizens. - create a free economic system that "guarantees individual initiative and private ownership"
... that cardinal mar nasrallah boutros sfeir's daily appearances in newspapers become at most weekly ones, and that not ALL politicians feel the incessant urge to visit this RELIGIOUS figure to validate POLITICAL issues ...
~ 1.5 million Armenians were massacred almost a 100 years ago. Shouldn't the Lebanese of Armenian descent have a say in whether Turkish troops deploy in Lebanon, considering that Turkey till this day denies such a genocide ever occured?
Sectopolitics will remain the main avenue for the contestation of power, unless the political class applies a provision of Taif that calls for the formation of a high-ranking committee of the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of the parliament to lay down plans to eradicate the sectarian system of political representation. However, there are no signs that the sectarian political bosses will implement that provision any time soon. In effect, the new regime creates a sense of deja vu, because Article 95 of the previous constitution also stipulated that sectarian representation was only a temporary measure to guarantee a "just" distribution of power among sects. Until sectarian political representation is abolished, the Taif regime will continue to heighten sectopolitical polarization, just as the previous regime did. This is particularly true if the new regime produces a new structure of power whereby Muslims exercise political hegemony over the political process - that is, if one system of domination is supplanted by another.
In a sectarian society like Lebanon, it is impossible to satisfy all sects all the time. Such a system is in a constant state of turbulence due to the structure of power contestation. [...] Sect representatives, as the case of Lebanon indicates, have to respond to their constituency to alleviate some of their hardships by presenting the sect's demands to the government. Such a move could trigger a countermove by another sect. Thus instead of addressing the problem as a national concern that requires a concerted and programatic effort, sect representatives engage in a zero-sum struggle over finite resources.
...
Therefore, as long as Lebanon's political system depends on sect's representation and its elite refuses to secularize the system, open the political process, and establish meritocracy, Taif or any similar sectarian arrangement will perpetuate the polity's sectopolitical polarization ... the Taif accord does not seem to nurture the development of interelite consensus. (Richani, p. 146)
Definition: a political philosophy or rhetorical style that holds that the common person's interests are oppressed or hindered by the elite in society, and that the instruments of the state need to be grasped from this self-serving elite and used for the benefit and advancement of the people as a whole.(Wikipedia) Example: Michel Aoun.
I must admit that the three articles dealing with Nasrallah's interview are long enough such that I haven't gone through them all yet; however, they are (up to where I've reached, that is) an interesting read, and worth the time. I've stored them on another server since Assafir's archives expire after two months. Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Some commentary
It's that time of year again when Middle Eastern pundits parameterize Lebanon solely with regional variables, ignoring the not-so-ignorable effect local players have on past events, present politics, and future potential. Although the eastern dictator/assassin and the southern criminal are important, it is fundamental to comprehend that regional winds manufactured by Iran, Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, USA, France, ad infinitum are not absolute, and that Lebanese issues (economy, stability, security, etc.) do not hinge purely on external factors.
In other words: "Lebanese" must stop blaming others. Maybe it's time we grew up and attempted solving our own problems ...
... otherwise, even if individual problems are solved, Lebanon would not be a sustainable state due to the non-existent internal mechanism required to deal with such problems.
IDF has razed Hezbollah bunkers in Lebanon within past 24 hours By The Associated Press (September 1, 2006)
Israel Defense Forces troops have demolished an unspecified number of Hezbollah bunkers in southern Lebanon over the past 24 hours, the army said in a statement early Friday afternoon.
The statement said the bunkers contained rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortar shells, light arms and communications equipment.
The operation took place around the southern Lebanese village of Ayt a-Shab, the IDF said. Ayt-a-Shab was the scene of fierce fighting between Israeli soldiers and Hezbollah militants during the war in the north.
