"Elite" Families
My last post purposely ignored the role of elitist/traditional families in the perpetuation of the confessional system. Families such as the Jumblatts, the Gemayels, the Karamis, the Khazens, etc. have at one point or another, and to varying degrees, consolidated their political power within Lebanon by partly playing to confessional groupings. In addition to the prestige derived from political power, such families used (and some still use) their position to garner financial benefits. There is no reason for such families to attempt to change the current and corrupt system in place (this is a generalization; there have been some interesting exceptions in a couple of the mentioned families); why remove a "norm" that has helped line your pockets with gold, silver, and plain old cash? Pierre and Nadim are taking over for the Gemayels, Khazens have been in place since "forever" and have their mansion open to the "family" (for reasons other than niceties), Walid Jumblatt at times requires a percentage of the profits from some businesses in "his" area, and the existing titles of Sheikh, Beik, Emir, etc. play to the social prestige such families still enjoy. These families aren't in charge because they are right for the job, but are accepted by their respective "supporters" for various reasons, such as financial ones, in which the head of the family would hand out jobs and provide necessary contacts. Another reason (but not the only other one) can also be viewed as "the existential threat" which is verbalized by "X defends us." It is a classic argument of us vs. them; a point that can be made is that these groupings are not necessarily concrete, but rather of a constructive nature. These "faultlines" do fade (the extent of this "fade" depends on other factors) in the face of different groupings, as sociological experiments and studies, and, more importantly, "reality", have shown time and time again. It is easier though to assume the eternal and innate nature of confessional lines; this assumption lessens, and possibly ignores, the role these elite families have in propagating the myth of an existential threat, which is one tool they use to control their power base. The current political confessional system reinforces this myth, as is seen in arguments stating that this system defends the rights of minorities - at the expense of the individual, of course. Because of the necessary sectarian composition of the political body, most decisions taken by governing bodies will inevitably be perceived by portions of the public as having a sectarian flavor - and as a "threat" to their sect - thus empowering the elitist families, which have usually reacted to such situations under the pretence of "defending their sects," resulting in a vicious cycle. Unfortunately, these families will not abolish the confessional system, as they are here to "defend their constituents," and their feeble attempts at modifying the percentages can be viewed as attempts to hang on to the perks they had gathered. At the end of the day, only modifying the balance, as opposed to completely eradicating political confessionalism, will ensure that Lebanon is a nation of sects, thus catering to the families, as opposed to a nation of citizens.Just a (possibly incorrect and definitely incomplete) "thought".
posted by Lazarus, 10:56 PM
8 Comments:
Again,
A very interesting thought, but like you said its slightly incomplete in the following sense. While you are right about the influence of these "elite" families on their respective sects, I have trouble digesting that they are a major factor perpetuating sectarianism. To make my statement a little less strong, these families' influence is less than what it used to be.
For example, the sectarian (used as an adjective and not as the usual derogatory) Sunni scene is dominated by a family, but not one with an elitist history. Similarly the sectarian Christian scene is dominated by the likes of Jeajea and Aoun, much more than the Jmayyels. On the same note, though the effect of Shia families on their sect is highly debatable, neither HA nor Berri are traditional elitist groups. The only exception I can find among the sects is the druze whose two dominant forces are Jumblatt and to a much lesser extent Arslan. After this long argument, I want to propose that the people themselves may be part of a self propagating sectarian myth, whereby they support leaders from their own sect, whether traditional elitist families or sectarian parties or newly formed leaderships. In turn these leaderships pump into this system which sustains, and so on...
By
R, at 12:28 AM
Laz,
family, and by extension religion (you are born into a family that adopts a certain religion) are two sides of the Sectarian coin, if you will.
Your focus on the elite familes is a bit narrow. My own hypothesis has been that the glue holds Lebanon's different "societies"/sects together has always been patriarchal, nuclear and ultimately extended families.
r refers to patron-client networks, and how Lebanese may have dual loyalties (to the state and a particular family or party). Well, loyalties tend to be a little deeper, in a vertical sense.
If a "za'im" supports one particular family, the family then turns around and supports a particular individual member of it (or more). You see, what I'm trying to get at here is that the relationship between the Za'im and the individual is non-existant. Rather, a relationship between families and the Za'im exists.
The family is the intermediary that links the individual with the Za'im. Furthermore, there is a symbiotic relationship between the family and the za'im.
The za'im needs the family because it constitutes a "block" of individuals that may offer him votes or, during times of conflict, soldiers. The family, on the other hand, needs the za'im because it needs the resources to "buy" the loyalty of its members (again, if you will). You see: what use is there for a family if it cannot take care of its own?
If sectarianism is to be understood, observers must take a closser look at the "lesser" families.
By
Raja, at 3:38 AM
Great post, Laz.
I keep noticing that people here prefer to support a person instead of supporting a political thought. This person, in most cases, has inherited his position.
By
lifeflaw, at 3:53 AM
all,
you bring up valid points. R, i did not mean to imply that the role of these families are a major factor, but they are one of them. the hariri family has now, with the onset of saad, become one of these elite families, although the hariri history is much shorter; in fact, saad has no incentive to get to work towards a non-confessional system because of some of the points i mentioned. there are many exceptions of course to these families; berri, aoun, etc., but there are also ones that i did not mention like frangieh, and underestimating the relationship between frangieh and his constituents will color the situation. raf*, i like your characterization of the state as a patron, but it has been on the losing end of this competition, simply because it does not provide "services" to its client in the same way other patrons do. you are right in that these relationships are not static, and the families are aware of that; this is why they manipulate the system to their advantage. raja, yes, this post did deal with a very narrow subtopic, as did my other; as i previously mentioned, my holistic view of this issue does need to mature :) also, i probably did not make it clear in the post, but i didn't mean that the families have a direct relationship with the individuals. if, as you explain, the family gives a job to the father of a family, he automatically has the support of the rest of the family (generalization); this partly is what i mean by "existential threat." anyway, we should probably discuss your ideas over a nice glass of black label ;) ahmad, yes, that's true, and right now there is no reason for them to do otherwise.
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Lazarus, at 8:50 AM
Lazarus,
None of the leaders in Lebanon at this point have any interest in abolishing sectarianism. In fact they have every interest in keeping it. the main issue in my opinion is with the people who have to demand a change in the status quo, but who also have to produce the change that they desire... That aside, I don't believe that (most of)the Lebanese people have any desire to change the status quo, and one of the major factors in that as Raja pointed out is the family. This mini-institution has been sculpted over decades and centuries to be the main perpetuator of both sectarianism and the client-patron system...
I know I am not adding anything new here, but just wanted to highlight what I thought were imprtant insights into lebanese society.
By
R, at 3:10 PM
a little annecdote:
during the siege, relatives from the Takieddine family stayed over for a few days before they departed to Africa. One of them told me that he had met Jumblatt in Beit el Dine.
The man said that he had been with a high-profile relative of his who lived in the US, and who organized fundraisers and other events for Jumblatt when he visited.
When the three approached each other, Jumblatt eagerly shook the hand of the relative who lived in the US; however, when the narrator of the story extended his hand and greeted him, Jumblatt just ignored him.
The immediate reaction such a snub would solicit is: how rude! Or maybe, how obnoxious. And that's exactly how I reacted when I heard the story.
But now that I think about it, such behavior on the part of Jumblatt could not be more natural!
Only certain members of the Takieddine family (who reside and make a living in Lebanon) have access to Jumblatt and his court. These individuals curry favor with jumblatt on behalf of the family, and issue orders to the family on behalf of jumblatt. As such, they have power - the power of proximity and the power of representing an extended family unit.
Therefore, would not a hand shake with a "regular" family member undermine that power? Yes it would. Therefore Jumblatt refrained from doing so.
This annecdote, in my opinion, highlights the symbiotic relationship between the extended patriarchal family and the za'im. The relationship, as I mentioned in my previous comment, constitutes one of the pillars of sectarianism in Lebanon.
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Raja, at 8:54 PM
interesting story raja. jumblatt is quite a character :) but as you say, his reaction is expected. jumblatt's power relations are more on the feudal end of the spectrum then some of the other families.
i have experience with one of the families i mentioned above; unlike jumblatt though, the heads tried their best to know everyone, but like jumblatt, did concentrate their efforts on those with more power than others.
ah, the memories ...
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Lazarus, at 9:34 PM
Guys, the way you refer to "those families" made feel like an alien. I do agree with you however on many points. There is an interesting book which covers this issue in Lebanon which you might be interested in. It is called "Lords of the Lebanese Marshes" by Michael Gilsinen. I haven't read the whole book yet. The book is moreover one sided representing and telling the stories of the villagers or commoners only. You never get to read about the beys' view of the story. But as i said it is interesting as the author links the violence in the middle east to this sort of feudal relationships.
By
AbdulKarim, at 9:33 AM
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