Jumblatt and his Id "Have to Go"

In high school, we used the phrase “has to go” quite often. The context was usually when someone had done something annoying or frustrating, after which someone else would say “X has to go”, which simply means that X should really calm down.

Since it seems that immaturity can only be battled with immaturity, I will venture to say that “Jumblatt has to go.”

Walid Jumblatt’s recent call for American occupation of Syria – ignoring the irony considering his outburst during the Iraqi invasion against Wolfowitz – is something which should not have been said. At a time when several of the potent international figures have explicitly stated that they are not calling for a regime change in Syria, his irrational statement (a constantly defining trait of Jumblatt) puts his supporters, the Druze community, and Lebanon, “bi bouz el matfa`” – to use the first phrase that comes to mind.

One of the main reasons used in calling for regime change in Syria is that instability in Syria will always cause instability in Lebanon, which is not something I can argue against. So where does Jumblatt come off presenting his “solution” for the problem, which will create even more instability?

This antic comes as one more step in a two week long flurry of rash statements, many of which have been directed at Hezbollah. A recent one is that “Khaddam has dealt a blow to Assad and to his Lebanese ally, Hezbollah.” Hezbollah have not seriously replied to his antagonism, but fairly assuming that Nassrallah will still be the zaim of the Shiite for the next 20 years, are such attacks really in the best interests of the Druze? His statements have been upped a notch because of Khaddam’s bombshell (which, as a sidenote, has become an idiom in use here in Beirut – as in: that event was more shocking than Khaddam’s bombshell), and he has been selectively latching onto a series of statements that Khaddam has given, which should be in all rights used by the investigative committee. We should not expect, however, Khaddam as a potential candidate in a Syrian regime change. After his first interview with Al-Arabiya, and with all the criticism piling up, he has jumped slightly to the defensive and gives the impression that he was not the “ruthless dictator” that everyone thinks him to be. Sadly, that will never come across as believable.

Jumblatt continues to live up to the persona of a feudal lord with every passing day and statement. In political sociology, a feudal lord is someone who benefits from his subjects – which Jumblatt does in monetary terms (for example, he demanded from the owners of a clinic near Baakline 30% of their profit) – while they do not receive anything, except for the feeling of existence – which they do, given his recent behavior. It is such a person who is representing Lebanon – he may be an acute personality when it comes to shifting with the sands, but is rather obtuse when it comes to long term strategies.

I never thought that I would ever say this, but of all the leaders in this country, Aoun is appearing more and more rational (relatively speaking). He is saying things that people are saying – and thus fits into his role as a demagogue – but which very few of the other powerhouses is mentioning. His interview two days ago was not discussed in the major newspapers, which is effectively an attempt to erase him from the political map, since he has the potential to attract even more people to his following.

The current political irrationality goes further than Jumblatt and his “id” releasing statements. A politician has just accused another party of militia training. If I had not heard the same comment from a reliable source a week ago, I would not have believed this. But apparently, it is happening.

Caught between these acts, which continue to bury Lebanon beneath personal issues and monetary gains, the Lebanese people continue their days wondering when stability will finally soak in. There are many questions that can be asked, but few, as always, have an answer. Can Jumblatt’s power ever decrease, with another leader attracting a following in the Druze? Will followings stop intersecting fully with sects? Will Lebanon once again resort to the quick fix that is a quota change? Or will there be a more fundamental political shift that transforms the inherent paradox of a confessional democracy into something more transparent, and ultimately, much more productive?

posted by Lazarus, 1:03 AM